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Abstract 
This paper examines the effect of organizational distance (i.e. distance between the 
headquarters of the bank that grants a loan and the location of the borrower) on the use of 
collateral for business loans by Spanish banks on the basis of the recent lender-based 
theory of collateral [Inderst and Mueller (2007)]. We find that, for the average borrower, the 
use of collateral is higher for loans granted by local lenders than by distant ones. We also 
show that the difference in the likelihood of collateral in loans granted by local lenders, 
relative to distant lenders, is higher among older and larger firms and among firms with 
longer duration of the lender-borrower relationship, than, respectively, younger, smaller firms 
and shorter duration. We also find that banks use lending technologies that are different for 
near and for distant firms, in response to organizational diseconomies. 
JEL: G21, L22 
Keywords: bank lending technologies, distance, collateral, organizational diseconomies. 
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1 Introduction 
The physical location of banks is relevant in determining the terms and availability of 
banking services. Customers’ transportation costs produce spatial differentiation of banks’ 
softening competition [Chiappori et al. (1995)]. Banks’ costs of gathering and processing 
site-specific information about potential borrowers increase with distance [Almazan (2002); 
Petersen and Rajan (2002)] so distant banks will be less informed about local credit market 
conditions than banks closer to the borrowers.1 Previous research has documented an 
increase in distant bank lending to small business over time, especially in the US, and has 
examined its causes [Mester (1997); Petersen and Rajan (2002); DeYoung, Hunter and 
Udell (2004)], as well its consequences in terms of interest rates on loans [Petersen 
and Rajan (2002), Degryse and Ongena (2005);  Agarwal and Hauswald (2007)] and of the 
credit quality of the loans granted [Carling and Lundberg (2002); DeYoung, Glennon and 
Nigro (2006)]. This paper examines the unexplored issue of how the firm-bank distance 
affects the use of collateral for loans, with Spanish data on individual bank loans.2 
Why loans are collateralised (or not) has traditionally been explained as the 
result of informational advantages of borrowers over lenders; in these situations, the use of 
collateral attempts to offset the problems of adverse selection [Bester (1985); Chan and 
Kanatas (1985); Besanko and Thakor (1987a and b)] and/or of moral hazard [Chan 
and Thakor (1987); Boot, Thakor and Udell (1991)] caused by information asymmetry. On the 
other hand, Inderst and Mueller (2007) explain the use of collateral as a way to exploit 
the information advantage of local lenders, relative to distant ones, in evaluating the 
credit risk of a loan in situations where competition limits the interest rates that local 
banks can charge on the loan (positive reservation profit of the borrower). In old models, 
the use of collateral varies across loans as a function of the characteristics of borrowers 
(“borrower-based” theories), while in the more recent “lender-based” theory of Inderst and 
Mueller, the use of collateral varies with the characteristics of lenders, namely the relative 
informational advantage of local over distant lenders. We draw on the lender-based theory 
of collateral to formulate the empirical hypothesis on the effect of distance in the likelihood of 
the use of collateral in business loans. 
Advances in credit scoring, and other transactional lending techniques, enlarge 
the relevant market around a branch and therefore, with fixed costs per branch, we expect 
to see an increase in the average distance from the branch to customers’ locations, and 
a decrease in the equilibrium number of branches serving the whole territory. In Spain, 
however, banks expand geographically, opening branches country-wide, and the density 
of branches per capita remains stable over time. We also provide evidence that loans granted 
in a province by banks with no branches in that province have been ⎯and continue to be⎯ 
negligible, while the distance between the location of the headquarters of the bank and the 
                                                                          
1. A distinction is made between soft information, collected by the bank through repeated direct interactions with the 
firm it does business with, and hard information that is equally available to close and distant lenders. The use of soft 
versus hard data in lending decisions is more correlated with relational or transactional lending technologies, respectively 
[Boot (2000); Berger and Udell (2002)]. Dell’Ariccia and Márquez (2004) and Hauswald and Marquez (2006) explicitly 
model banking competition and interest rate determination, assuming that banks’ information on borrowers decreases 
with distance. 
2. The use of collateral is very common in loans to business firms [Berger and Udell (1995); Harhoff and Körting (1998); 
Degryse and van Cayseele (2000); Jiménez, Salas and Saurina (2006a)], and has micro- and macro-economic 
implications in terms of credit availability [Jiménez, Salas and Saurina (2006b)] and economic growth [Bernanke, Gertler 
and Gilchrist (1999)]. 
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provinces where the loans are granted, increases in parallel to branch expansion. We have no 
direct evidence as to how the physical distance from firms to the banks they borrow 
from has evolved over time in Spain but, from other evidence available a relevant research 
question to ask is how the use of collateral in business loans is affected by the observed 
increase in organizational distance, namely that between the headquarters of the bank 
(top decision-making power) and the operating branches serving customers in local markets.3 
We address this research question with a large data-base on individual loans to 
firms by Spanish banks in the period 1992 to 2002. The data come from the Credit Register 
of the Banco de España, which contains information on all loans of 6,000 euros or more 
granted by all Spanish banks, to firms of all sizes, anywhere in the country. The sample data 
used in the paper includes all loans to firms for which accounting data from the Commercial 
Register is available for the year before the loan was granted (almost half a million loans). 
Accounting ratios, together with size, and the past loan-defaulting history of the borrower 
(as reported in the Credit Register), are the kind of hard data that can be used by distant 
lenders to assess the credit quality of the borrower. For each loan, we know its size, maturity 
and if it is collateralised or not, but information on the interest rate is not available. The use 
of collateral is the dependent variable to be explained as a function of the firm-bank 
organizational distance, hard (accounting) data on the credit quality of the borrower, relational 
lending variables, characteristics of the loan and province, bank, industry and time 
control variables. Not knowing the interest rate of the loan should not be a major limitation in 
explaining the use of collateral, since the interest rate and the use of collateral are both 
jointly-determined, endogenous, variables, and each should be explained separately 
as a function of the relevant exogenous variables. Two limitations of the data are that 
we do not know the physical distances of the firm-branch and of the firm-nearest branch from 
a competing bank, and we have no information on loan applications that were refused 
by banks. Physical distances have been available only in studies that use data on loans 
granted by a single bank [Carling and Lundberg (2002); Degryse and Ongena (2005); Agarwal 
and Hauswald (2007)]. Our data includes loans granted by the population of banks, and 
we use an alternative proxy for information differences between local and distant banks. 
On the other hand, Agarwal and Hauswald (2007) find that controlling for sample-selection 
bias does not affect their main findings. 
Banks can be physically closer to potential borrowers by opening branches in 
local markets. But whether physical proximity to the customer will reduce the informational 
advantage of local banks (those with headquarters and decision-making power 
physically close to the borrower) over organizationally-distant ones (those with headquarters 
and decision-making power a distance away from the local branch) is an open question. 
If the bank centralizes decision-making power to avoid agency and related costs of 
delegation, then information on the credit quality of the loan application will have to be 
communicated from the local branch to the bank headquarters. The quality of the centralized 
decisions will depend on the quality and information content of the data communicated, 
received and processed. Alternatively, the bank may decide to decentralize the decision 
on granting the loan, and its terms, to the branch manager, thus avoiding distortions in the 
communication process, but it then faces agency and related costs of delegation. The two 
                                                                          
3. The organizational distance variable is used by Berger and De Young (2001) to measure the distance in miles between 
the parent and the affiliate in US multi-bank holding companies. They are interested in testing how control of parent over 
affiliated banks has evolved over time according to advances in new banking technologies. Alessandrini, Presbitero and 
Zazzaro (2006) refer to functional distance which includes spatial as well as cultural distance between the headquarters 
of the bank and the province where the bank has branches; they investigate if functional distance affects the credit 
constraints of firms. 
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solutions imply organizational diseconomies [Stein (2002)] i.e., a loss in efficiency compared 
with what could be achieved if there were no information asymmetries and conflicts of 
interests. 
Banks, like any complex organization, are affected by organizational diseconomies, 
and the evidence confirms that their internal decision-making and control processes are 
responsive to such factors. For example, Berger et al. (2005) find that lending transactions 
with small firms follow a different pattern if the lender is a small bank, than if it is a large bank: 
large banks tend to rely more on hard data and transactional lending, while small banks 
specialise in the use of soft data and relational lending. They explain the different lending 
practices between small and large banks as a consequence of organizational diseconomies, 
which force large banks to rely on hard, codified data for internal transmission of information. 
When organizational diseconomies are important, the organizational distance becomes the 
key supply-side factor affecting the terms of loans, independently of whether banks have 
branches in the local market or not. In testing the hypothesis from the lender-based theory of 
collateral, we use organizational distance as a proxy for information differences about local 
market conditions among competing banks. 
We find that organizational distance is a relevant variable in explaining the use 
of collateral for business loans, in two ways. First, the likelihood of the use of collateral 
decreases with organizational distance, and the effects of the distance variable on such 
likelihood are independent of the experience of the bank in the province. Second, 
the effect of organizational distance on the likelihood of collateral, decreases when the 
accounting variables (hard data), which refer to the credit quality of the firm, are included as 
explanatory variables of the use of collateral. Therefore, the empirical evidence supports 
the notion that organizational diseconomies affect the lending decisions of banks, and 
shows that hard data and organizational distance are, somehow, substitutes in the collateral 
decision. These results are in line with those of Agarwal and Hauswald (2007), who find that 
firm-bank physical distance is no longer statistically significant in explaining the interest 
rate of the loan, after controlling for banks’ soft proprietary information on the credit quality of 
the borrower. This is interpreted as evidence that firm-bank proximity is a source of local 
informational advantage for the bank. On the other hand, we find that distant lenders 
can offset their informational disadvantage when hard data is available to assess the credit 
quality of the borrower. 
We also find that, controlling for the credit quality of the borrower, the effect of 
organizational distance on the use of collateral for loans differs as a function of observable 
characteristics of the firm, such as age and size: the likelihood of collateral increases with 
organizational proximity (the opposite to organizational distance) in loans granted to older and 
larger firms, while it decreases with proximity in loans granted to younger and smaller firms. 
This evidence is consistent with the lender-based theory of collateral, which predicts that 
local lenders are more likely to ask for collateral for loans granted with lower informational 
advantage, which is expected to be the case among larger and older firms, for whom more 
public information will be available. 
Another finding of the paper is that the likelihood of the use of collateral decreases 
with concentration in the credit market, but it does so at a lower rate in loans granted to 
borrowers with longer-standing relationships with the lender. Competition is expected to be 
lower as the credit market becomes more concentrated. The lender-based theory of collateral 
predicts that local lenders will use collateral to collect rents from borrowers that have higher 
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reservation profits, i. e. they obtain higher profits by getting the loan from a distant bank. 
In more concentrated (less competitive) markets, reservation profits are expected to be lower, 
and therefore less use of collateral is expected ⎯a prediction corroborated by the empirical 
evidence. There are, however, other explanations of the use of collateral as a function of 
credit market competition, consistent with this evidence. The unique prediction from the 
lender-based theory of collateral is that the effect of higher reservation profit on the decision 
to use collateral is less, the higher the informational advantage of the local lender. Longer 
duration of the firm-bank relationship is expected to increase the informational advantage of 
the lender, so the estimated positive cross-effect of market concentration and duration 
variables on the likelihood of collateral supports the prediction from the lender-based theory 
of collateral. 
Finally, we find no different time trend in the likelihood of collateral in loans granted by 
local versus organizationally distant lenders, controlling for the other explanatory variables 
of the collateral decision. This evidence suggests that advances in transactional lending 
technologies (credit-screening methodologies) over time, if any, do not seem to have altered 
the competitive conditions of the credit market for firms in Spain. 
The paper contributes to the literature in two significant ways. First, it provides 
the first direct evidence on how organizational distance affects the use of collateral to secure 
bank loans to firms, which helps to explain why organizational diseconomies induce banks 
to specialize in different lending technologies for local and for distant borrowers. Second, the 
paper is the first to empirically test the predictions from the lender-based theory of collateral, 
the only one that explains the use of collateral solely as the result of informational advantages 
of local lenders, and the threat of distant lenders to challenge them, taking advantage of 
technological developments in transactional lending. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the main hypothesis 
to be tested, drawn from the lender-based theory of collateral. Section 3 contains the data 
sources, the description of the observable variables and the formulation of the empirical 
model. Section 4 presents the results of the empirical analysis, including a description of the 
time evolution of organizational distance in lending in Spain. The discussion of main findings 
and conclusions closes the paper. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 13 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0816 
2 Firm-bank distance and use of collateral for loans 
The “lender-based” theory of collateral [Inderst and Mueller (2007)] explains why loans will 
be secured with collateral as a consequence of the heterogeneity of lenders in the same 
credit market. On the contrary, the “borrower-based” theory explains collateral as a function 
of information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders about the credit risk of the loan. 
In borrower-based explanations of collateral, all banks in the same relevant market face 
similar information asymmetries, while lender-based theories assume that there are two 
different banks, one local close to the borrower, and other distant from the borrower. 
The relevance of being a local or a distant bank is that the former has an informational 
advantage over the later. 
Inderst and Mueller (2007) assume that the information advantage of the local lender 
is in the form of a more precise estimate of the success probabilities of the project to be 
financed. Borrowers are attracted by local lenders, but the outside option ⎯the alternative of 
going to the distant lender⎯ gives borrowers a reservation profit. This profit limits the interest 
the local lender can charge on the loan to exploit any informational advantage. Inderst and 
Mueller (2007) show that by asking for collateral, the local lender finds an effective 
and efficient way to overcome the limit on the interest rate, and still take advantage 
of any superior information. Collateral is of no use in lending by distant lenders, so the theory 
predicts that the use of collateral will be limited to loans granted by local lenders. 
Transportation costs limit the relevant market for banking services to a relatively 
small radius around a particular bank branch. To increase their size, banks have to open 
branches in distant markets and by doing so they gain proximity to the potential customer. 
Branch managers of distant banks will collect information about the local credit market 
and, after some time, they will have the same information about the characteristics of the 
firms, and the projects in which they invest, as managers of local banks. Local and distant 
banks will face effectively different operating conditions when the local branch manager 
is an imperfect substitute for the top manager of the bank. 
Organization diseconomies can cause such imperfections, resulting from the 
expected increase in management costs per unit of output, as the size and/or complexity 
of the organization increases. Management costs are those resulting from the coordination 
and motivation of people in organizations under information asymmetries, and from conflicts 
of interest between general management and the operating units of the organization. 
Communication costs create loss of control and distorted information transmission in 
hierarchical organizations [Williamson (1967); Harris and Raviv (2005)]. Delegation of decision 
power to lower level units reduces communication costs, but is likely to increase 
delegation and agency (motivation) costs if lower level units pursue their own objectives 
[Holmstrom (1979); Aghion and Tirole (1997)]. 
As banks expand geographically, by opening branches/subsidiaries in remote 
markets, they become larger and more complex. The empirical evidence shows that their 
operating efficiency is inversely related to the average distance from headquarters 
to operating units [Berger and DeYoung (2001 and 2006)]. Senior management of the bank 
will try to minimize such inefficiencies, and will take action to respond to the distorted 
incentives of branch managers in transmitting private information to the bank headquarters, 
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especially when information is soft and non-codified [Stein (2002); Brickley, Linck and 
Smith (2003)]. The empirical evidence also shows that the decision-making power of local 
branch managers is often restricted [Udell (1989)] and communication with headquarters 
is limited to that which cannot be easily distorted [Berger et al. (2005)]. Under these 
circumstances, branch managers will not be motivated to invest in soft information, which will 
not be used because they do not have the decision-making power to grant the loan, or 
because the information cannot be effectively communicated to the central loan officer. 
On the other hand, bank owners can create powerful incentives for organizationally distant 
branch managers to collect hard data, which can be internally communicated at low cost, by 
committing to funding the loans that originated such data [Stein (2002)].4 
Organizational diseconomies will then favor the use of hard data, and more 
formal communication, between branch managers who collect the relevant information on 
the loan  application, and the distant officers who will make the final decision. 
As organizational distance increases, it is more likely that the loan will be processed using 
transactional lending technologies, which in turn implies that the loan is granted to safe and 
highly transparent borrowers, i.e. those borrowers for whom the loan is less likely to be 
collateralized [Berger and Udell (2002); Berger (2006)]. On the other hand, if organizational 
diseconomies are insignificant, then distant lenders with branches in local markets will learn 
by experience the characteristics of borrowers in their respective markets. As the experience 
of the distant bank in the local market increases, organizational distance will be less and less 
relevant in explaining the use of collateral for loans, since local and distant banks will 
progressively decide loan applications with the same information. Thus, the following 
hypotheses, if not rejected, will provide preliminary evidence in support of the lender-based 
theory of collateral (H1.a) and will validate the relevance of organizational distance as a proxy 
of information differences across banks (H1.b and H1.c). 
H1.  a) For given characteristics of the borrower, the likelihood of the use of collateral 
in bank loans decreases with organizational distance. 
b) Organizational distance makes decisions on the use of collateral more dependent 
on hard and transparent data about the characteristics of the borrower. 
c) The effect of organizational distance on the likelihood of collateral is the same for 
any level of experience of the bank in the local market. 
2.1 Distance, use of collateral and characteristics of firms 
Comparative static analysis from the main result of the lender-based theory of collateral 
provides further empirically testable predictions. Inderst and Mueller (2007) show that, if the 
theory is correct, one will observe a higher likelihood of collateral for loans to borrowers 
with ex ante credit risk than for loans to borrowers with low credit risk. They also show that 
the proportion of loans with ex post default will be higher among loans with collateral than 
among loans with no collateral. Jiménez, Salas and Saurina (2006) provide empirical evidence 
that supports this first prediction, and Jiménez and Saurina (2004) confirm that collateralized 
loans are ex post riskier than non-collateralized loans. However, the two empirical evidences 
are also consistent with borrower-based theories of collateral, assuming problems of adverse 
                                                                          
4. Agarwal and Hauswald (2007) report that, in the bank they get the data from, credit decisions reside with branches, 
i.e. their credit decisions are highly decentralized. It is expected that banks will differ in their decentralization policies. 
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selection and moral hazard in the borrower-lender relationship [Boot, Thakor and 
Udell (1991)].5 
The impossibility of separating predictions on the use of collateral from lender- and 
borrower-based theories of collateral occurs with other observable variables, such as the 
duration of the firm-bank relationship, and credit market concentration. Longer duration 
of the firm-bank relationship will implies higher informational advantage for the bank that 
grants the loan, and the lender-based theory predicts a lower likelihood of collateral in 
longer than in shorter relationships. But the duration of the relationship also supports mutual 
trust, and attenuates the problems of moral hazard originating from information asymmetry 
[Boot and Thakor (1994)].6 In more concentrated credit markets, the reservation profit of the 
borrower will be lower, since competition is less intense. Therefore, from the lender-based 
theory, the use of collateral is less likely in more concentrated credit markets. The prediction 
is supported by existing empirical evidence [Jiménez, Salas and Saurina (2006a)], but again, 
there are alternative explanations from borrower- based theories. 
The unique predictions from the lender-based theory of collateral are those from 
Inderst and Mueller’s (2006) propositions 5 and 6, which imply a different effect of 
organizational distance (information advantage of local lenders) and credit market competition 
(reservation profit of the borrower) on the likelihood of the use of collateral, depending on the 
observable characteristics of the borrower. 
The informational advantage of the local lender will be higher when lending to more 
opaque borrowers, since organizationally distant banks do not have reliable hard data 
(public information) for those borrowers to evaluate their credit risk. If organizationally distant 
banks can collect hard data for older and larger firms, but not for opaque, younger and 
smaller firms, then the informational advantage of the local lender will occur mostly among 
younger and smaller firms. The lender-based theory of collateral will predict that the likelihood 
of collateral for loans granted by local lenders will be higher than the likelihood of collateral for 
loans granted by distant lenders, within the groups of borrowers where the informational 
advantage of the former is lower, i.e., when lending to older and larger firms. 
The duration of the borrower-lender relationship is expected to increase the private 
information on the borrower collected by the lender. But the same duration is expected to 
translate into higher informational advantage for loans granted by local lenders than for loans 
granted by distant ones, because the lender-borrower relationship produces private and soft 
information that flows ⎯with difficulty⎯ through long communication channels. Age and size 
of the firm imply more public knowledge, and hence more uniform information, for the local 
as well as the distant lenders who do business with them. Duration, on the other hand, is 
expected to be positively correlated with more private information, which can be valuable 
for local banks but not so much so for distant banks (assuming organizational diseconomies). 
                                                                          
5. The literature distinguishes between predictions on collateral from credit risk observed by the lenders [Leeth and 
Scott (1989); Berger and Udell (1990 and 1995); Jiménez, Salas and Saurina (2006a)] and predictions under 
information asymmetry. These can either respond to unobserved characteristics of the borrower at the time of the loan 
[adverse selection; Bester (1985); Chan and Kanatas (1985); Besanko and Thakor (1987a and b)], or to unobserved 
effort [moral hazard, Chan and Thakor (1987); Boot and Thakor (1994)] or to unobserved characteristics and effort 
[Boot, Thakor and Udell (1991)]. If information asymmetry is reduced to that which causes adverse selection problems, 
the prediction is that the use of collateral will be positively associated with the credit quality of the borrower, since use of 
collateral is a signalling device. 
6. Lenders could use their informational advantage to delay borrowers and ask for higher interest rates, and for 
more use of collateral in loans, compared to those with no information advantage [Sharpe (1990); Rajan (1992)]. In this 
case, longer borrower-lender relationships imply a higher likelihood of the use of collateral in loans. 
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For this reason, a longer duration of the borrower-lender relationship is expected to 
decrease the likelihood of collateral for loans granted by both local and by distant lenders, 
but more intensively for the former that for the latter. 
Proposition 6 of Inderst and Mueller (2007) establishes a different effect of 
reservation profits of the borrower on the likelihood of collateral for each level of informational 
advantage of the local lender:  The difference in the likelihood of using collateral for a loan with 
higher reservation profits of the borrower, compared with that for a loan with lower reservation 
profits, will decrease with the informational advantage of the local lender. If duration of the 
borrower–lender relationship is a measure of private information the borrower has about 
the lender, then Proposition 6 of Inderst and Mueller says that the negative effect of market 
concentration (less competition) on the likelihood of collateral should be moderated by the 
duration of the borrower-lender relationship. 
The predictions from propositions 5 and 6 are summarized in the following 
hypothesis. 
H2.  a) As organizational proximity of the bank-firm increases, the likelihood of the 
use of collateral is expected to increase for loans to older and/or larger firms. 
b) Longer duration of the lender-borrower relationship is expected to lower the 
likelihood of collateral in loans granted by all lenders but more intensively in loans granted 
by local lenders than in loans granted by distant ones. 
c) The likelihood of the use of collateral decreases with credit market concentration, 
but the rate of decrease is lower as the duration of the borrower-lender relationship increases. 
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3 Data, variables and econometric model 
The empirical part of the paper combines two data sets, the Credit Register database of 
Banco de España (CIR) and the Commercial Register (CR). The CIR provides information 
on all new loans, above a minimum threshold of 6,000 euros, granted to firms by any Spanish 
bank. Our sample period runs from 1992 to 2002. For each loan, information is available 
about type of instrument, currency, collateral, amount, maturity, identity of the borrower, 
industry, region, identity of the lender, and if the loan is in default at the end of the year 
or not.7 However, no information is available on whether collateral is internal or external, 
nor on the interest rate, nor on the purpose of the loan. Each loan decision is matched with 
additional characteristics of the borrower; mainly those obtained using the accounting data 
that the firm reports to the CR, including age of the firm and its industry.8 
We know the province of the borrower, and the province where the headquarters 
of the bank is located. The variable organizational distance, DISTANCE, is calculated as the 
physical distance in Km between the location of the headquarters of the bank and the capital 
of the province where the firm is located. The inverse of distance, 1/DISTANCE, will measure 
bank-firm organizational proximity. Loans granted in the province where the bank has its 
headquarters are assigned an organizational distance equal to zero, i.e. they are considered 
to be loans granted by local lenders. The bank office where the loan is processed is 
not known, and the physical distance between the branch and the location of the borrower 
is not available. The experience of the bank in the province is measured by the variable 
SHARE, equal to the market share of the bank in the stock of business loans in the province 
at the end of the year. 
There are 50 provinces in Spain, and this is the lowest level of geographic market 
for which desegregated data is available. Credit market concentration is measured by the 
Herfindahl index, HERFINDAHLm,t, equal to the sum of squared market shares of business 
loans granted by each bank in the province m, at the end of the year t.9 
From the CIR data we group borrowers into three credit risk categories: those who 
have a loan in default at the time they receive a new loan, those who do not have a loan in 
default at the time they receive a new one, but default the following year, and the remaining 
borrowers. Borrowers in the first group are identified by the dummy variable DEFAULTt-1, 
which takes the value of 1 if the borrower receiving the loan has any other loan in default, 
and 0 otherwise. Borrowers who default on a loan in t+1, not having defaults in t-1, are 
identified by the dummy variable DEFAULTt+1, which takes the value of 1 if the firm defaults 
(any loan) in t+1but did not have a default in t-1, and 0 otherwise. The remaining borrowers 
include those who do not default in the year prior to, and in the year after, the loan is granted. 
Banks can consult the CIR to learn the credit situation of the borrower at the time the new 
loan is applied for. Therefore DEFAULTt-1=1 includes all borrowers of observed low credit 
                                                                          
7. All banks have access to the total exposure of the borrower in the Spanish banking system at the time the loan 
is granted. They also know if the firm is in default on any of its existing loans. However, the CIR does not supply historical 
data on the borrower’s previous defaults. 
8. Commercial Register data is collected and sold by Informa, the Spanish division of Bureau Van Dyck. 
9. Jiménez, Salas and Saurina (2006b) provide evidence of a positive association between the Herfindahl index in the 
representative province of banks and the Lerner index, a direct measure of the market power of banks. They also 
compare the concentration measures in Spanish provincial markets with those in more local markets, such as SMA used 
in US studies [as in Petersen and Rajan (1995), for instance]. 
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quality. The other variable, DEFAULTt+1, is an indication of ex post credit quality of the 
borrower, in the sense that those borrowers with DEFAULTt+1=1 are borrowers who reveal 
ex post as of low credit quality. 
Other observable characteristics of the borrower include size, age and 
accounting-based performance measures. Size of the firm is measured by total ASSETS at 
the end of year. Accounting statements provide measures of profitability, solvency and 
liquidity (ACCOUNTING VARIABLES). Profitability is measured by ROA = EBIT/ASSETS. 
The solvency and liquidity variables are: equity to assets ratio, EQUITY/ASSETS; coverage of 
interest expenses by earnings before interests and taxes, INTEREST INCOME/EBIT; debt 
maturity, SHORT TERM DEBT/TOTAL DEBT; the inverse of the current ratio, SHORT TERM 
DEBT/CURRENT ASSETS, and the liquidity ratio, CASH/TOTAL ASSETS. The variables 
size, equity finance, return on investment and liquidity are positively associated with the 
credit quality of the borrower; for the remaining variables, we expect a negative correlation 
to credit quality. 
Controlling for ex ante risk (using accounting data), the evidence of a higher 
likelihood of collateral for borrowers with DEFAULTt+1=1, than for borrowers with 
DEFAULTt+1=0, supports the predictions on use of collateral and credit risk from the 
lender-based theory of collateral, and from the borrower-based theory when information 
asymmetry derives from problems of moral hazard. However, when information asymmetry 
creates problems of adverse selection, and collateral is used to signal high credit quality, then 
the likelihood of the use of collateral is expected to be higher for borrowers who do not 
default in t+1, i.e. in higher quality borrowers (see note 4). 
AGE of the borrower is the number of years since the firm was created. The intensity 
of relational lending will be measured by the number of years since the lender granted 
the first loan to the borrower, DURATION. We use NUMBER OF LENDERS, the number of 
banks the borrower has loans with at the time the loan is granted, as a control variable, 
since duration of a given borrower-lender relationship is expected to be different across firms 
of the same age but who do business with more or fewer banks. We include age of the 
firm as a proxy for public information about the credit quality of the borrower, and duration 
as a proxy for private information. 
Control variables include also SIZE of the loan, the amount of money lent in 
thousands of euros; SHORT TERM LOAN, a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
loan is of a maturity between 1 to 3 years, and 0 otherwise.10 We also control for fixed effects, 
including BANK, PROVINCE, INDUSTRY and TIME, among the explanatory variables of the 
collateral decision. There are 50 province dummy variables, each taking the value of 1 if the 
loan is granted to a firm located in the respective province, and 0 otherwise. Firms are 
grouped into 11 industries and the time dummy variables expand from December 1992 to 
December 2002. The sample data includes around 200 banks, both commercial and savings 
banks (credit cooperatives are excluded because of incomplete data). 
                                                                          
10. Loans with maturity of less than 1 year are excluded, since we do not know if they are new loans or rollovers of 
existing loans. 
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The full empirical model to be estimated is formulated as follows: 
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where )exp(1
1)( xxF β−+=  is the Logistic distribution function. Index j indicates loan, k 
indicates firm and t indicates time period. The dependent variable COLLATERALjkt is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if loan j, granted to firm k in period t, is collateralized and 0 
otherwise. The explanatory variables that are likely to have decreasing marginal effects on the 
likelihood of collateral are introduced in the model in log form: ASSETS, AGE, DISTANCE, 
DURATION and SIZE OF THE LOAN.11 The model is first estimated excluding the cross 
effects variables, except Ln DISTANCE x SHARE. This basic model will be used to test H1 
and to verify if the predictions on determinants of collateral from the borrower, and from the 
lender-based theories of collateral, are supported by our data. The predicted signs for the 
estimated coefficients in the basic model are: β1<0, β2 = β3=0 (from H1.a and H1.c). From 
H1.b the absolute value of estimated β1 is expected to decrease when age, size and 
accounting variables are added as explanatory variables. Other expected results are:  β4<0 
(less competition), β5>0 (reputation and information advantage of local lender), β6 ? (positive 
from borrower-based and non- positive from lender-based), β7>0, β8>0 β9<0, β10<0 
(credit risk). 
The second block of estimations will include the cross effects, one at a time, for the 
purpose of testing H2. The predicted signs for the estimated coefficients are β11<0, β13<0 
(H2.a), β12>0 (H2.b), β14 >0 (H2.c). 
                                                                          
11. For AGE, DISTANCE and DURATION we add 1 before taking logs because these variables can take the 
value of zero. 
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4 Results 
4.1 Summary statistics 
Statistics on the variables that provide information about the situation of distant lending 
in Spain, from 1992 to 2004, are presented in Table I. For commercial banks, savings banks 
and credit cooperatives, we show the proportion of the volume of loans granted by 
banks with no branches in the province where the borrower is located; the average 
organizational distance (assuming that distance is zero if a loan is granted in the province 
where the bank headquarters is located), and the proportion of bank branches in 
provinces outside the province where the headquarters of the bank is located. 
For all banks and years, the proportion of loans granted by banks with no branches 
in the province is very small. While this ratio is stable over time for commercial banks 
(around 5%) and credit cooperatives (9%), saving banks show a decline of around 4% to 8%.  
These percentages can well be explained by the cross-border relationships between 
neighboring provinces. Thus, to have a branch in a market is still very important in Spain, 
in order to reach business customers. On the other hand, organizational distance 
has been steadily increasing over time for all ownership forms, but especially among 
savings banks, with average distance of 237 Km in 1992 and 309.5 km in 2004, and 
among credit cooperatives, where distance doubles in the time period, from 72 Km in 1992 
to 146 Km in 2004. Finally, the last three columns of Table I provide evidence of the 
geographical expansion of branches, mainly by savings banks and cooperatives. In 1992 
commercial banks, saving banks and cooperatives had 77.2%, 39.2%, and 11.7% of their 
branches distant from their headquarters (i.e. in a different province from that where 
the headquarters were located), respectively. In 2004, the proportions were 82.9%, 55.1% 
and 34.7%, respectively. 
Table II provides additional descriptive information on the characteristics of 
borrowers (non-financial firms of all ages) and the loans contained in the database to be used 
in the estimation of the model.12 As shown, 31% of all loans with maturity longer than one 
year granted to business firms have collateral, a number in line with data from other countries 
[Berger and Udell (1990); Harhof and Körting (1998)]. Average organizational distance 
is 354 Km with a maximum of 2,684 Km and a minimum of 0; 30% of all loans are granted by 
local banks. 
The average HERFINDAHL index across provinces and years is 7.15, which implies 
an equivalent to around 14 banks of equal size in the province.13 Market concentration is 
comparatively lower than concentration values in US studies. For example, Black and 
Strahan (2002) report average deposit Herfindahl index of 19.1 across MSAs in the USA 
(standard deviation of 6.7). The reason is that the province, our relevance market by 
assumption, is a larger territory than an MSA. In around 2% of the loans, borrowers had a 
loan in default at the time of taking a new one, while in 3% of the loans, borrowers with 
no defaulted loans at the time they were granted a new one, default one or more of the loans 
                                                                          
12. The accounting variables have been windsorized, setting the observations above (below) the 95th (5th) percentile at 
the value of the 95th (5th) percentile to eliminate extreme values that can distort the results. AGE and the NUMBER OF 
LENDERS have been windsorized in the same way, but only above their 95th percentile. 
13. Average concentration in provincial markets is rather low, and has been relatively stable over time despite intense 
merger activity. Low concentration and mergers have been compatible, thanks to the geographical expansion of existing 
banks opening branches across the country, as documented in Table I. 
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in the following year. Since the data sample contains almost 500,000 loans, the sample sizes 
of loans with DEFAULTt-1=1, and with DEFAULTt+1=1, are around 9,000 and 13,500 
observations, respectively. The average age of firms in the sample is 10.7 years, and the 
average size in terms of total assets is 3.05 million euros. The range of age and size is quite 
wide, so smaller and younger firms are well represented in the sample.14 The summary 
statistics of the accounting variables indicate that the economic and financial situation 
of the firms in the sample is quite diverse. The average length of the relationship between the 
borrower and the lender in the sample is 4.22 years, although dispersion in duration is also 
very high. The average size of the loan represents around 13% of the average assets 
of the firms in the sample, with high dispersion of values across firms. 43% of the loans in the 
sample are short-term, with a maturity of 1 to 3 years, and the rest are long-term. 
4.2 Collateral and organizational distance 
Table III presents the results of estimating the basic model that includes a test of 
hypothesis H1 on the relevance of organizational distance for the terms of the loans. 
Model 1 includes Ln DISTANCE, SHARE and Ln DISTANCE x SHARE as the only explanatory 
variables (together with control variables). Models 2 and 3 also include characteristics 
of the loan size and maturity, and characteristics of the borrowers, with variables such 
as DEFAULTt-1, AGE, ACCOUNTING VARIABLES, DURATION and DEFAULTt+1. 
The estimated coefficient on Ln DISTANCE is negative and statistically significant 
in all regressions (H1.a). In Model 1, when borrower and bank-borrower characteristics 
are excluded from the explanatory variables, the likelihood of collateral in a loan granted 
in the province where the bank has its headquarters, Ln DISTANCE = 0, is 6.8% higher than 
the likelihood of collateral in a loan with organizational distance equal to the sample 
mean of 354 Km (setting all other variables at their sample means). Moreover, as distance 
increases by 1%, the probability that the loan will be collateralized decreases by 1.1%. 
Therefore, organizational distance has economic relevance in addition to statistical 
relevance. Also, in Model 1, the coefficients of the SHARE and of SHARE x Ln DISTANCE 
are not significantly different from zero (H1.c). If the market share of loans in the province is a 
measure of knowledge of local market conditions by the bank, the evidence suggests that 
this knowledge does not affect the decision on collateral. The conjecture posed by the paper, 
to explain this result, is that organizational diseconomies prevent local information, collected 
in the local branches, being used by the central loan office of the bank. 
Model 2 shows that, when public knowledge on borrowers’ characteristics 
(size, age, accounting ratios, DEFAULTt-1) is added as explanatory of the use of collateral 
for business loans, the estimated coefficient of Ln DISTANCE, in absolute value, is one-half, 
and significantly lower than that estimated in Model 1. This result is consistent with the 
hypothesis that organizational distance relies primarily on hard data for loan granting 
decisions, and for determining the terms of the loan, i.e., if the loan is secured with collateral 
or not (H1.b). The addition of further borrower characteristics as explanatory variables, those 
that are closely related to soft data (DEFAULTt+1 and DURATION), lowers further the 
estimated coefficient of the distance variable (Model 3). However, the new estimated 
coefficient in Model 3, for DISTANCE, is not statistically different from that of Model 2. 
                                                                          
14. These numbers are in line with those used in other studies, such as Harhoff and Körting (1998) for Germany, and 
Petersen and Rajan (1995) and Berger and Udell (1995) for the US, although the average size of the firm in our sample 
is larger since the analysis here is not limited to small firms. 
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Overall, hypothesis H1 is not rejected by the data. The finding in Table III, that the 
likelihood of collateral for loans increases as bank-firm organizational proximity increases 
(the inverse of distance), is consistent with the argument of Inderst and Mueller (2007), that 
collateral is useful to local lenders as a way to profit from their informational advantage 
about the true risk of the project to be financed. The fact that organizational distance loses 
statistical and economic significance, when the observable characteristics of the firm are 
included as explanatory variables, indicates that distant banks rely on hard data in their 
lending decisions. We find that distant banks lend to borrowers of observed high credit 
quality, and thus the likelihood of collateral for loans granted by distant lenders is lower than 
for loans granted by local lenders. 
As a robustness analysis, we explicitly examine if the characteristics of borrowers 
from distant banks differ from those who borrow from local banks. To do so, we compare the 
likelihood of collateral for a local lender, DISTANCE=0, versus a distant lender, DISTANCE>0, 
for those loans where the borrower had no previous relations with the current lender, 
DURATION=0. The estimation, not reported, shows that the first loan from local lenders tends 
to be granted to smaller and younger borrowers, compared with the size and age of 
borrowers who begin the relationship with distant lenders (the observed credit quality, 
in terms of accounting variables, is the same in both groups of lenders). Furthermore, 
the borrower who begins the relationship with a local lender tends to have prior relations 
with a significantly lower number of banks than the borrower who begins a relationship with 
a distant lender. This corroborates the fact that borrowers who begin a relationship with a 
distant lender are, in fact, more informational transparent, and have higher bargaining power, 
than those who begin the relationship with a local lender. 
4.3 Other factors explaining the use of collateral 
Table III provides information on the determinants of the use of collateral, additional to those 
having to do with organizational distance, which can be reconciled with both lender- and 
borrower-based theories of collateral. The most complete estimation, Model 3, shows positive 
estimated coefficients for the variables DEFAULTt-1, and DEFAULTt+1; lower performance, in 
terms of solvency, liquidity and profitability of the borrower, also implies a higher likelihood 
of collateral. Further, the likelihood of collateral decreases with the size of the borrower 
(i.e. a negative coefficient for the variable Ln ASSETS is expected). Therefore, the prediction 
from the two theories, that the use of collateral is expected to be higher in riskier loans, is 
confirmed by the data. 
The marginal analysis confirms the economic relevance of these findings. To be 
in the group of borrowers with a loan in default at the time of getting a new one, 
DEFAULTt-1=1, increases the likelihood of collateral for the new loan by 35.9%, compared 
with the likelihood among borrowers who did not default on a loan the previous year. Those 
borrowers with no defaulted loans at the time of asking for the new loan, who default 
the subsequent year, DEFAULTt+1=1, increase the likelihood of collateral for the new loan 
by 17.2%, compared with the likelihood of collateral for loans to those who do not default 
in t+1. A joint, one standard deviation change over the mean of the performance variables, in 
the direction of lower performance and more risk, increases the likelihood of pledging 
collateral for a loan by 38.1%.15 
                                                                          
15. We have estimated the coefficient of DEFAULTt+1 with and without accounting variables and the results are 
practically identical in both cases. Thus, the evidence indicates that the variable DEFAULTt+1 tells us about the collateral 
decision with data not contained in previous year accounting variables. The simple correlations of DEFAULTt+1 with all the 
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Another result of Table III, supported by both theories of collateral, is the negative 
association between likelihood of collateral and market concentration, the estimated 
negative coefficient of HERFINDAHL. That is to say, collateral is more likely in a more 
competitive credit market, assuming that competition is inversely related to market 
concentration.16 
The AGE of the borrower has an estimated coefficient with negative sign in 
the model where DURATION is excluded (Model 2), and positive in the model with DURATION 
as an explanatory variable (Model 3). The estimated coefficient of DURATION is negative.  
The simple correlation between AGE and DURATION is 0.40, so that when DURATION is 
excluded from the model, AGE captures part of the effect of the former in the decision 
on the use of collateral. The evidence that longer duration lowers the likelihood of 
the use of collateral is consistent with borrower- and lender-based theories of collateral, 
and consistent with findings from other empirical research [Berger and Udell (1995); 
Harhof and Körting (1998)]. The existing evidence of the use of collateral and age of the firm is 
less clear; controlling for duration, age tends to be non-significant on the collateral decision 
[Berger and Udell (1995); Harhof and Körting (1998)]. 
The evidence from Table III, that bank loans to older firms are more likely to be 
collateralized, controlling for duration, cannot be explained by borrower-based theories 
of collateral. In fact, Berger and Udell (1995) predict a negative sign for the coefficient of age: 
as time goes on, there are more opportunities to separate firms into good or bad credit 
quality firms. The evidence, however, can be explained from the lender-based theory of 
collateral if the informational advantages of local versus distant lenders decreases as firms get 
older, i.e. if public knowledge on the credit quality of the firm increases with age of the firm. 
The basic model on the determinants of collateral (Model 3) also shows that the 
likelihood of collateral in business loans is highly dependent on loan characteristics such 
as the volume of the loan and its maturity: larger volume and longer maturity of loans imply a 
higher likelihood of collateral. 
4.4 The cross effect of distance and characteristics of firms in the use of collateral 
To test the predictions specific to the lender-based theory of collateral, H2, the empirical 
model must incorporate the cross effect variables, as shown in Table IV (SHARE was 
excluded, since it appeared to be statistically non-significant). The first estimation, Model 1, 
adds the cross effect of age and distance. In the new estimation, Ln DISTANCE has a 
positive estimated coefficient, while the coefficient of the cross effect variable is negative. 
                                                                                                                                                 
other explanatory variables, including accounting ratios, gives correlation values always lower than 4%. We have 
estimated the model including DEFAULTt+1 x Ln AGE, and DEFAULTt+1 x Ln ASSETS, as additional explanatory 
variables (one at a time) to evaluate if information in DEFAULTt+1 is affected by the age and size of the firm. In both 
cases, the coefficient of DEFAULTt+1 now becomes negative, while the coefficient of the cross effect variable is 
positive. Therefore, for younger and smaller firms, the likelihood of collateral is lower in firms with DEFAULTt+1 =1 than 
in firms otherwise. This would be consistent with the use of collateral to signal credit quality by younger and smaller 
firms, those who are expected to know their credit quality much better than do lenders. As firms get older or larger, 
lenders increase the soft information about the borrower, and the use of collateral is explained by observed risk 
[see Jiménez, Salas and Saurina (2006a) for further evidence on this issue]. 
16. Since the effect of credit market competition on loan characteristics in the world of adverse selection and moral 
hazard affects mainly younger and smaller firms, where information asymmetry between banks and firms is specially 
high, the model of collateral has been estimated including HERFINDAHL x Ln AGE and HERFINDAHL x Ln ASSETS, 
one at a time, as additional explanatory variables, to allow for differences in the effect of market competition on the 
use of collateral according to the age and size of the firm. The combined coefficient of the HERFINDAHL variable 
in each case is (–0.047 + 0.014 Ln AGE) and (-0.207 + 0.026 Ln ASSETS), respectively (all coefficients statistically 
significant at 1%). All remaining coefficients of the model are practically unchanged. The hypothesis is confirmed: market 
concentration affects the use of collateral more significantly among smaller and younger borrowers than among larger 
or older ones. 
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The coefficient of the proximity variable (-Ln DISTANCE) is now (-0.031+0.017 Ln AGE), and 
all estimated coefficients are statistically significant. The negative estimated coefficient of 
the distance variable, in Table III, indicates that for the sample mean of Ln AGE, organizational 
proximity between lender and borrower increases the likelihood of collateral for loans. 
The result from Table IV indicates that the effect of proximity on the likelihood of collateral 
is positive for firms of age over 7 years (e0.031/0.017) and negative for firms less than 7 years old. 
This evidence is consistent with H2.a, which says that proximity positively affects 
the likelihood of collateral when the loan is granted to more transparent firms (and age 
is correlated with transparency).17 
In Model 2, the cross effect variable is distance times size of the borrower. 
As predicted, the sign of the cross effect variable is negative, while the estimated 
coefficient for the DISTANCE variable changes to positive. Therefore, the coefficient of the 
proximity variable is now (-0.047+0.007Ln ASSETS). Again, the two coefficients are 
statistically significant. For the average size of borrowers, proximity increases the likelihood 
of collateral (Table III), but the effect of organizational proximity on the likelihood of collateral is 
positive for larger borrowers (those with assets above 812.5 thousand euros) and negative 
for smaller ones, as the hypothesis predicts, when differences in size imply differences in 
informational advantage by closer lenders (H2.a). 
When the differences in information between local and distant lenders are captured 
by the variable duration, the estimated coefficient of duration as a function of distance is 
(-0.046-0.011 Ln DISTANCE). Now, proximity implies higher a likelihood of collateral 
as duration increases, which is contrary to what was initially predicted (H2.b). Since this result 
does not support the lender-based theory of collateral, it deserves additional attention. 
One possible explanation for this contradictory result is that local lenders use their information 
advantage to delay borrowers, and take more time to reduce the collateral requirements 
of those borrowers observed to be of high quality. Another plausible explanation is that, as 
indicated above, distant lenders begin their lending relationship with highly transparent 
borrowers, and therefore learn quite quickly about their true credit quality. Local lenders, on 
the other hand, begin the relationship with more opaque borrowers and learning about their 
credit quality takes place more slowly. 
The last column of Table IV shows the estimated coefficient of market concentration, 
HERFINDAHL, as a function of duration of the borrower-lender relationship, (-0.032 + 0.011 
Ln DURATION).18 The coefficient of market concentration decreases in absolute value 
with duration of the relationship. This confirms that, as the outside opportunities of the 
borrower are reduced (fewer banks in the market), the likelihood of collateral for the loan 
is also lower, but the effect of the reduction is marginally lower for those loans to borrowers 
where the information advantage of the lender is higher, that is to say, borrowers who have 
longer relationships with the lender. This result supports H2.c and Proposition 6 of Inderst 
and Mueller (2007). 
                                                                          
17. The estimation of Model 1 can also be formulated in terms of the effect on the likelihood of collateral of an increase 
in the age of the borrower, for loans granted by local banks, and for loans granted by distant banks. The relevant 
estimated coefficient is now that of Ln AGE, (0.126 – 0.017 Ln DISTANCE). For a loan granted by a local bank 
(i.e. Ln DISTANCE=0) the marginal increase in the likelihood of collateral, if age of the borrower increases 1%, is 6.8%, 
while for a loan at the sample average distance of  354Km the marginal increase is 3.0%, a full 56.1% lower. 
So, an increase in the age of the borrower implies a higher increase in the likelihood of the use of collateral for loans 
granted by local lenders than for loans granted by distant lenders, consistent with the theory. 
18. The coefficient of HERFINDAHL is negative for values of duration lower than 29 years, a value outside the range of 
sample values of the variable duration. 
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The lender-based theory of collateral predicts an increase over time in the use of 
collateral for loans by local lenders whenever advances in availability, transmission and 
analysis of data increase the efficiency of transactional lending for distant lenders. To see if 
such increases occurred in our data, the basic model on the determinants of collateral 
(Model 3, Table IV) is estimated allowing a different time effect for those loans granted by local 
lenders, DISTANCE=0. The estimated coefficients of the TIME dummy variables from this 
model, for loans by local lenders and for loans by distant lenders, are represented in Figure 1. 
The evolution over time of the likelihood of collateral for loans granted by local lenders, and for 
loans granted by distant lenders, controlling for the other explanatory variables, proceeds in 
parallel. We have no evidence that the pattern of collateral use for loans by local lenders 
departs in an increasing trend from the use of collateral by distant lenders, as Inderst and 
Mueller (2007) conjecture.19 
                                                                          
19. The time stability of the pattern of differences in the use of collateral between local and distant lenders also 
suggests that the internal control problems within geographically expanded banks remain relatively invariable over time, 
besides technological advances, which contrasts with the results of Berger and De Young (2001). 
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5 Conclusion 
Spain has by far the largest per capita bank branch density among European countries.20 
In the past five years, the number of branches has increased at an annual rate above 4%. 
Evidence from the US for the same time period indicates that banks have been increasing 
the use of credit scoring and distant lending technologies in small business lending, so that 
physical distance in business lending is higher today than it was several years ago. We have 
no direct data on the use of transactional lending technologies by Spanish banks, nor on 
the physical distance between the bank branch that processes the loan and the location 
of the firm that gets the loan, but the geographic expansion of bank branches does not fit well 
with the expansion of physically distant lending. 
The Spanish case suggests focusing on the implications, for the terms of business 
loans, of organizational distance, that is, the distance between the location of the top 
decision-making power of the bank (i.e. its headquarters) and the location of the borrower 
who receives a loan. Organizational diseconomies in lending imply that organizational 
distance is sufficient to preserve the informational advantage of local lenders, even after 
a distant bank opens a branch in the local market. Organizational distance becomes close 
to physical distance, which has been investigated as an important variable for the workings of 
credit markets. Our paper focuses on the implications of distance for the use of collateral for 
business loans, drawing on the lender-based theory of collateral [Inderst and Mueller (2007)], 
which explicitly models collateral decisions as a function of distance between borrowers and 
lenders. 
The paper documents the increase in organizational distance in bank lending in 
Spain during the period 1992 to 2002. The empirical evidence also shows that the likelihood 
of collateral for loans is less for loans granted by distant than by local lenders. This supports 
the explanation of collateral from the lender-based theory, saying that collateral is used by 
local lenders to profit from their superior information advantage about the credit risk of the 
borrower, while collateral has no significance for loans granted by distant lenders. It also 
shows that distant lending, and the use of hard data on the borrower in loan decisions, 
appear to be close substitutes in explaining the use of collateral for loans. This is consistent 
with the hypothesis that organizational diseconomies in lending will foster specialization 
of banks in relational and transactional technologies, depending on their comparative 
advantage: local banks will use more relational lending, and lend to more opaque and 
informationally complex firms, while distant banks will specialize in transactional technologies 
and lend to more transparent borrowers. In this respect, we also find that those firms who 
begin a relationship with a local lender are smaller and younger than those who begin a 
relationship with a distant lender. 
The results of the tests of predictions from the lender-based theory of collateral 
are mixed. We find evidence that the age of the firm, which can be considered a proxy of 
information transparency, increases the likelihood of collateral more rapidly for loans from 
local lenders than for loans from distant lenders. We also find that increases in the 
informational advantage of lenders (longer duration of the borrower-lender relationship), 
reduce the likelihood of collateral at a faster pace in less concentrated credit markets (higher 
                                                                          
20. See ECB (2005). 
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reservation profit of the borrower) than in more concentrated ones. The two results support 
the lender-based theory of collateral. But at the same time, we find that longer duration in the 
borrower-lender relationship lowers the likelihood of collateral at a faster pace for loans from 
distant lenders than for loans from local lenders. In addition, the use of collateral for loans 
granted by local lenders shows no trend over time. These last two pieces of evidence do not 
support the lender-based theory of collateral. 
Overall, the evidence from the paper suggests that there exists some segmentation 
in lending technologies by local and distant banks, and that the informational advantage 
of the local lender, with respect to the risk of the project to be financed, is relevant in 
explaining the use of collateral, and, possibly, other terms, for loans granted by local lenders. 
But local lenders are also likely to be affected by borrowers’ private information, which 
creates problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. This could explain why credit 
market concentration is especially relevant in explaining differences in the likelihood of 
collateral for loans to smaller and younger firms, i.e. those for whom information asymmetry 
is expected to be more pronounced (see footnote 16). 
One open question is the future of the Spanish banking industry, with larger and 
more time-consuming networks of branches. High branch density increases customer 
services and helps banks to increase volume of activity and profits. However, a branch close 
to the potential borrower does not seem to affect the informational difference between local 
and distant banks, so the organizational distance between the borrower and the bank is 
determinant of the lending specialization of banks, not the physical distance determined by 
the location of the branch. The situation may change in the future, as both banks and 
customers become more effective and efficient, with technological advances facilitating the 
use of transactional lending technologies. This is beginning to happen with deposits, where 
Internet banks already have a significant market share of new deposits. The empirical support 
of the lender-based theory of collateral, provided in this paper, suggests that it is reasonable 
to expect a more pronounced specialization of banks in the future, with local banks serving 
opaque and informational complex borrowers, and national banks, with a smaller branch 
network than they have today, competing with transactional lending technologies suitable for 
dealing with more transparent borrowers.  
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Table I. Evolution of distant lending to firms by Spanish banks. Whole population of loans to firms from CIR database.  
December of every year  
 
Year Commercial banks Saving baks Credit cooperatives Commercial banks Saving baks Credit cooperatives Commercial banks Saving baks Credit cooperatives
1992 3.5 8.3 9.5 372.0 236.9 72.1 77.2 39.2 11.7
1993 4.2 9.0 9.1 368.4 237.5 65.0 76.5 40.7 11.9
1994 3.9 7.1 10.5 358.7 231.7 65.1 77.1 41.6 12.1
1995 3.6 6.8 9.6 362.6 235.0 64.0 77.1 42.6 12.5
1996 3.5 5.8 10.5 356.5 241.5 75.0 77.1 43.7 13.3
1997 3.6 5.2 9.9 356.4 252.2 74.9 77.2 44.9 15.2
1998 3.8 4.8 8.8 363.5 247.5 72.4 77.3 46.9 16.8
1999 4.2 4.7 8.0 400.3 258.0 76.5 79.2 48.6 17.8
2000 4.6 4.9 8.0 437.1 273.4 96.0 81.9 50.3 21.5
2001 4.8 4.8 7.9 438.3 286.8 99.2 81.5 51.3 23.1
2002 8.2 4.8 8.1 408.0 299.9 114.3 81.7 51.9 32.4
2003 5.9 4.7 8.3 444.3 309.8 131.9 82.9 52.6 33.6
2004 5.4 4.3 8.0 437.6 309.5 146.2 82.9 53.5 34.1
Percentage of loans granted by banks 
with no branches in the province
Average distance from the headquarter of the bank to the 
province of the borrower (Km)
Percentage of bank branches in all provinces except the one 
that contains bank headquarters
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Table II. Descriptive Statistics of the sample variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean, standard deviation (S.D.), minimum and maximum values of the variables for the period 1992-
2002. COLLATERALjkt is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the loan j granted to firm k in t has 
collateral, and 0 otherwise. DISTANCEkt measures the Km from the capital of the province where the 
headquarter of the bank is located, to the capital of the province where the firm receiving the loan is 
located. HERFINDAHLt is the index of credit market concentration, equal to the sum of banks squared 
market shares in loans made in each one of the fifty Spanish provinces in year t. DURATIONk,t-1 is the 
number of years of lender-borrower relationships before the loan is granted.  SHAREkt is the market share 
of the bank in business loans in the province where the loan is granted. NUMBER OF LENDERSk,t-1 is the 
number of banks with which the firm has loans at the time the loan is granted. AGEk,t-1 is the number of 
years since the firm was set up, lagged one year. DEFAULTk,t-1 is a dummy variable with value 1 if the firm 
k that gets the loan in t had a loan in default in t-1, and 0 otherwise. DEFAULTk,t+1 is a dummy variable 
that takes the value 1 if the firm k does not have a loan in default at the time the loan is granted but 
defaults in the following year. ASSETSkt,-1 is the amount of total assets of the firms. EQUITY/ASSETSkt,-1 
proxies for the firm’s solvency. INTEREST INCOME/EBITk,t-1 is the coverage of interest expenses by 
earnings before interest and taxes. ROAk,t-1 is the profit over total assets ratio. LIQUIDITY RATIOkt,-1 is the 
ratio between cash and total assets. SHORT TERM DEBTkt is firms’ debt with a maturity less than one 
year. SHORT TERM DEBT/CURRENTkt,-1 is the inverse of the current ratio. ASSETS SHORT TERM 
LOANjkt is a dummy variable that takes one if the loan j has a maturity between one and three years. 
SHAREkt is the share of the bank in the province where the loan is granted. All financial ratios and 
ASSETSk,t-1  have been windsorized at percentiles 5% and 95%. AGEk,t-1  has been windsorized at 
percentile 95%. SIZE OF THE LOANjkt and ASSETSk,t-1 in thousands of euros and in constant prices of 
2002. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables Mean S.D. Minimum Maximum
  COLLATERAL jkt (1/0) 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00
  DISTANCEkt  353.84 416.94 0.00 2,684.00
  HERFINDAHLt  (%) 7.15 2.42 3.60 20.01
  DURATIONk,t-1 4.22 4.12 0.00 18.00
  NUMBER OF LENDERSk,t-1 4.91 4.45 0.00 23.00
  AGEk,t-1 10.70 7.44 0.00 25.00
  DEFAULTk,t-1 (1/0) 0.02 0.13 0.00 1.00
  DEFAULTk,t+1 (1/0) 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00
  ASSETSk,t-1 3,049.58 3,508.54 78.00 9,937.00
  EQUITY/TOTAL ASSETSk,t-1 (%) 26.38 18.46 2.34 74.60
  INTERETS INCOME/EBITk,t-1 (%) 48.03 48.63 -68.42 148.89
  ROAk,t-1 (%) 7.51 6.66 -5.88 24.89
  LIQUIDITY RATIOk,t-1 (%) 102.07 59.70 21.48 280.10
  SHORT TERM DEBT/CURRENT ASSETSk,t-1 (%) 71.20 23.86 19.05 100.00
  SHORT TERM DEBT/TOTAL DEBTk,t-1 (%) 5.37 7.24 0.00 33.53
  SIZE OF THE LOANjkt 402.77 959.11 6.42 6,671.10
  SHORT TERM LOANjkt (1/0) 0.43 0.50 0.00 1.00
  SHAREkt (%) 7.35 6.64 0.00 41.32
No. Observations 449,931
No. Firms 148,869
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Table III. Estimation of the basic model on distance and use of collateral 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Logistic estimation on the determinants of the use of collateral in loans for the pool of data. Time period 
1992-2002. COLLATERALjkt is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the loan j granted to firm k in t 
has collateral and 0 otherwise. DISTANCEkt measures the Km from the capital of the province where the 
headquarters of the bank is located to the capital of the province where the firm receiving the loan is 
located. HERFINDAHLt is the index of credit market concentration, equal to the sum of banks squared 
market shares in loans made in each one of the fifty Spanish provinces in year t. DURATIONk,t-1 is the 
number of years of lender-borrower relationships before the loan is granted.  SHAREkt is the market share 
of the bank in business loans in the province where the loan is granted. NUMBER OF LENDERSk,t-1 is the 
number of banks with which the firm has loans at the time the loan is granted. AGEk,t-1 is the number of 
years since the firm was set up, lagged one year. DEFAULTk,t-1 is a dummy variable with value 1 if the firm 
k that gets the loan in t had a loan in default in t-1, and 0 otherwise. DEFAULTk,t+1 is a dummy variable 
that takes the value 1 if the firm k does not have a loan in default at the time the loan is granted but 
defaults in the following year. ASSETSkt,-1 is  the amount of total assets of the firms. EQUITY/ASSETSkt,-1 
proxies for the firm’s solvency. INTEREST INCOME/EBITk,t-1 is the coverage of interest expenses by 
earnings before interest and taxes. ROAk,t-1 is the profit over total assets ratio. LIQUIDITY RATIOkt,-1 is the 
ratio between cash and total assets. SHORT TERM DEBTkt is firms’ debt with a maturity less than one 
year. SHORT TERM DEBT/CURRENTkt,-1 is the inverse of the current ratio. ASSETS SHORT TERM 
LOANjkt is a dummy variable that takes one if the loan j has a maturity between one and three years. 
SHAREkt is the share of the bank in the province where the loan is granted. 9 time dummies, 49 regional 
dummies, 10 industry dummies and 194 bank dummies included in all models. Robust standard error 
(SE) to equal correlation within panels shown. ***, **, * mean statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%.  
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Dependent Variable COLLATERAL jkt (1/0) COLLATERAL jkt (1/0) COLLATERAL jkt (1/0)
Estimation Logit Logit Logit
Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
  Log(DISTANCEkt)  -0.020 0.004 *** -0.010 0.003 *** -0.007 0.003 **
  SHARE kt 0.001 0.002  -- --  -- --  
  Log(DISTANCEkt)* SHAREkt 0.000 0.000  -- --  -- --  
  HERFINDAHLt -0.013 0.005 *** -0.017 0.005 *** -0.019 0.005 ***
  Log(DURATIONk,t-1) -- --  -- --  -0.094 0.007 ***
  Log(NUMBER OF LENDERSk,t-1) -- --  -- --  -0.471 0.021 ***
  Log(AGEk,t-1) -- --  -0.041 0.012 *** 0.056 0.012 ***
  DEFAULTk,t-1 (1/0) -- --  0.593 0.046 *** 0.662 0.044 ***
  DEFAULTk,t+1 (1/0) -- --  -- --  0.317 0.029 ***
  Log(ASSETSk,t-1) -- --  -0.382 0.007 *** -0.251 0.009 ***
  EQUITY/TOTAL ASSETSk,t-1 -- --  -0.008 0.000 *** -0.011 0.000 ***
  INTERETS INCOME/EBITk,t-1  -- --  0.000 0.000  0.001 0.000 ***
  ROAk,t-1  -- --  -0.004 0.001 *** 0.001 0.001  
  LIQUIDITY RATIOk,t-1 -- --  0.001 0.001 * -0.002 0.001 ***
  SHORT TERM DEBT/CURRENT ASSETSk,t-1  -- --  -0.001 0.000 *** -0.001 0.000 ***
  SHORT TERM DEBT/TOTAL DEBTk,t-1  -- --  -0.006 0.000 *** -0.006 0.000 ***
  Log(SIZE OF THE LOANjkt) 0.361 0.007 *** 0.577 0.008 *** 0.562 0.008 ***
  SHORT TERM LOANjkt (1/0) -2.494 0.014 *** -2.402 0.014 *** -2.399 0.014 ***
  Constant -0.712 0.946  2.067 0.819 ** 1.630 4.069  
  Time dummies yes yes yes
  Reginal dummies yes yes yes
  Industry dummies yes yes yes
  Bank dummies yes yes yes
No. Observations 449,931 449,931 449,931
Pseudo R2 0.298 0.323 0.329
Log L -195,547 -188,605 -186,908
χ2  covariates (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table IV. Test of predictions from lender-based theory on the effect of distance in 
the use of collateral for different values of other explanatory variables (cross effects)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Logistic estimation on the determinants of the use of collateral in loans for the pool of data.Time period 
1992-2002. COLLATERALjkt is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the loan j granted to firm k in t 
has collateral, and 0 otherwise. DISTANCEkt measures the Km form the capital of the province where the 
headquarter of the bank is located to the capital of the province where the firm receiving the loan is 
located. HERFINDAHLt is the index of credit market concentration, equal to the sum of banks squared 
market shares in loans made in each one of the fifty Spanish provinces in year t. DURATIONk,t-1 is the 
number of years of lender-borrower relationships before the loan is granted. SHAREkt is the market share 
of the bank in business loans in the province where the loan is granted. NUMBER OF LENDERSk,t-1 is the 
number of banks with which the firm has loans at the time the loan is granted. AGEk,t-1 is the number of 
years since the firm was set up, lagged one year. DEFAULTk,t-1 is a dummy variable with value 1 if the firm 
k that gets the loan in t had a loan in default in t-1, and 0 otherwise. DEFAULTk,t+1 is a dummy variable 
that takes the value 1 if the firm k does not have a loan in default at the time the loan is granted but 
defaults in the following year. ASSETSkt,-1 is the amount of total asets of the firms. EQUITY/ASSETSkt,-1 
proxies for the firm’s solvency. INTEREST INCOME/EBITk,t-1 is the coverage of interest expenses by 
earnings before interest and taxes. ROAk,t-1 is the profit over total assets ratio. LIQUIDITY RATIOkt,-1 is the 
ratio between cash and total assets. SHORT TERM DEBTkt is firms’ debt with a maturity less than one 
year. SHORT TERM DEBT/CURRENTkt,-1 is the inverse of the current ratio. ASSETS SHORT TERM 
LOANjkt is a dummy variable that takes one if the loan j has a maturity between one and three years. 
SHAREkt is the share of the bank in the province where the loan is granted. 9 time dummies, 49 regional 
dummies, 10 industry dummies and 194 bank dummies included in all models. Robust standard error 
(SE) to equal correlation within panels shown. ***, **, * mean statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Dependent Variable COLLATERAL jkt (1/0) COLLATERAL jkt (1/0) COLLATERAL jkt (1/0) COLLATERAL jkt (1/0)
Estimation Logit Logit Logit Logit
Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
  Log(DISTANCEkt)  0.031 0.006 *** 0.047 0.010 *** 0.008 0.003 ** -0.007 0.003 **
  Log(AGEk,t-1) * Log(DISTANCEkt) -0.017 0.002 *** -- --  -- --  -- --  
  Log(ASSETSk,t-1) * Log(DISTANCEkt) -- --  -0.007 0.001 *** -- --  -- --  
  Log(DURATIONk,t-1) * Log(DISTANCEkt) -- --  -- --  -0.011 0.002 *** -- --  
  HERFINDAHLt -0.019 0.005 *** -0.019 0.005 *** -0.019 0.005 *** -0.032 0.006 ***
  Log(DURATIONk,t-1)* HERFINDAHLt -- -- -- --  -- -- 0.011 0.002 ***
  Log(DURATIONk,t-1) -0.095 0.007 *** -0.094 0.007 *** -0.046 0.011 *** -0.170 0.020 ***
  Log(NUMBER OF LENDERSk,t-1) -0.470 0.021 *** -0.469 0.021 *** -0.470 0.021 *** -0.470 0.021 ***
  Log(AGEk,t-1) 0.126 0.014 *** 0.056 0.011 *** 0.053 0.012 *** 0.055 0.012 ***
  DEFAULTk,t-1 (1/0) 0.662 0.044 *** 0.662 0.044 *** 0.661 0.044 *** 0.662 0.044 ***
  DEFAULTk,t+1 (1/0) 0.316 0.029 *** 0.316 0.029 *** 0.316 0.029 *** 0.318 0.029 ***
  Log(ASSETSk,t-1) -0.252 0.009 *** -0.222 0.010 *** -0.252 0.009 *** -0.251 0.009 ***
  EQUITY/TOTAL ASSETSk,t-1 -0.011 0.000 *** -0.011 0.000 *** -0.011 0.000 *** -0.011 0.000 ***
  INTERETS INCOME/EBITk,t-1  0.001 0.000 *** 0.001 0.000 *** 0.001 0.000 *** 0.001 0.000 ***
  ROAk,t-1  0.001 0.001  0.001 0.001  0.001 0.001  0.001 0.001  
  LIQUIDITY RATIOk,t-1 -0.002 0.001 *** -0.002 0.001 *** -0.002 0.001 *** -0.002 0.001 ***
  SHORT TERM DEBT/CURRENT ASSETSk,t-1  -0.001 0.000 *** -0.001 0.000 *** -0.001 0.000 *** -0.001 0.000 ***
  SHORT TERM DEBT/TOTAL DEBTk,t-1  -0.006 0.000 *** -0.006 0.000 *** -0.006 0.000 *** -0.006 0.000 ***
  Log(SIZE OF THE LOANjkt) 0.562 0.008 *** 0.563 0.008 *** 0.562 0.008 *** 0.562 0.008 ***
  SHORT TERM LOANjkt (1/0) -2.399 0.014 *** -2.398 0.014 *** -2.399 0.014 *** -2.399 0.014 ***
  Constant 1.445 0.875 * 1.403 0.872  1.518 4.141  1.689 0.873 *
  Time dummies yes yes yes yes
  Reginal dummies yes yes yes yes
  Industry dummies yes yes yes yes
  Bank dummies yes yes yes yes
No. Observations 449,931 449,931 449,931 449,931
Pseudo R2 0.330 0.329 0.329 0.329
Log L -186,869 -186,884 -186,887 -186,894
χ2  covariates (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Figure 1. Time effects on the likelihood of collateral for local and organizational 
distant lenders after controlling for the rest of explanatory variables.  
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